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to an appreciation of the domestic currency, which is in line with the classic intuition.
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but the effect gradually dies out as the horizon gets longer. This can be explained with
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interpretable and significant results for the stock exchange index.
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A tanulmány a magyar monetáris politika azonnali hatását vizsgálja három eszközár-
kategóriára: a forint árfolyamára, az azonnali és forward állampapír-piaci hozamokra
valamint a BUX indexre. Az endogenitás problémáját az elemzés Rigobon és Sack
(2004) által leírt heteroszkedaszticitáson alapuló identifikáció módszerével kezeli. Az
eredmények alapján egy meglepetésszerû kamatemelés hatására egy nap alatt az ár-
folyam erõsödik, ami a klasszikus intuícióval összhangban áll. Ez a hatás lényegesen
megnõ, ha a hatást kétnapos idõtávon vizsgáljuk, ami a pénzpiacok hatékonytalan-
ságára utalhat annyiban, hogy rövid idõ alatt nem teljes mértékben árazzák be a mo-
netáris politika által okozott meglepetéseket az eszközárakba. A monetáris politika az
azonnali hozamokra pozitívan hat, ám ez a hatás a lejárat hosszának növekedésével
jelentõsen lecsökken. Ennek oka a monetáris politika forward hozamokra gyakorolt ha-
tásában keresendõ, mivel a rövid horizonton pozitív, ám a hosszabb horizontokon
egyre erõsödõ negatív hatást mutatnak az eredmények, vagyis egy meglepetésszerû
kamatlépés a forwardgörbe elfordulásával jár együtt. Ugyanakkor a módszer nem ad
értelmezhetõ eredményeket a BUX index esetében.
Összefoglalás7
Monetary policy exerts its influence on the economy through several channels, and
asset prices play a major role in the propagation of changes in the monetary stance.
Mishkin (2001) mentions debt instruments, the exchange rate, stock market prices
and real estate prices as the major assets from the point of view of the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy. In order to assess how the transmission mechanism
works in reality, it is necessary first to get a picture how the central bank's decisions
affect the prices of these assets. As part of the series of studies of the Magyar Nemzeti
Bank on the monetary transmission mechanism, this paper analyses the immediate
impact of monetary policy on three classes of asset prices: the exchange rate, market
interest rates and the stock exchange index.
Theory does not provide an unambiguous answer how monetary policy affects the
exchange rate. The traditional view maintains that an increase in the domestic interest
rate makes domestic debt more attractive to foreign investors and generates demand
for the domestic currency. In a standard uncovered interest parity (UIP) framework, an
increase in the domestic interest rate implies a strengthening of the domestic curren-
cy assuming that exchange rate expectations and the risk premium are unchanged.
However, there can be several factors that can complicate this relationship, some of
which can even lead to a 'perverse' opposite relationship. Blanchard (2004) and
Stiglitz (1999) point out that – under certain circumstances depending among others
on the level of indebtedness and share of foreign financing in a country – a large
increase in the domestic interest rate might result in an increase of default risk thus
reducing the attractiveness of domestic debt which can lead to a weakening of the
currency. In addition, Garber and Spencer (1995) describe how the dynamic hedging
activity in options markets can lead to a 'perverse' effect of monetary policy on the
spot exchange rate.
The theoretical predictions of the likely reaction of market interest rates to monetary
policy are also mixed. Standard theories of monetary transmission suggest that mon-
etary contraction leads to higher short-term and long-term interest rates, i.e. an
1. IntroductionMagyar Nemzeti Bank
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upward shift in the yield curve (Mehra, 1996). Some add that because long-term rates
are an average of expected future short-term rates based on the expectation hypoth-
esis of the term structure, monetary policy has a smaller impact on long-term rates
(see for instance Cook and Hahn, 1989). Other studies emphasise, however, that while
monetary tightening raises short-term interest rates, it reduces expected future infla-
tion through higher real rates on the short term and therefore expected short-term
interest rates for future years decline (Mehra 1996, Romer and Romer 2000, Ellingsen
and Söderström 2001). Based on the expectation hypothesis of the term structure, this
can imply a negative impact on long-run rates on sufficiently long maturities provided
that the impact on expected inflation is sufficiently large. Therefore the impact on long-
term yields depends on the size of the reaction of short-term rates and on the impact
on average expected inflation for future years. 
Concerning the impact of monetary policy on stock prices, theory predicts a negative
reaction, i.e. a rise in the interest rate leads to a fall in stock prices (see for instance
Thorbecke, 1997 and Mishkin, 2001). In a standard stock valuation model, the value
of a firm's shares is equal to the present value of its expected future net revenues.
Monetary easing can therefore increase the value of the firm on the one hand by
reducing the discount factor and on the other hand by increasing the firm's future
nominal revenues.
Earlier studies on how Hungarian monetary policy can influence asset prices include
Kiss and Vadas (2005), who examine the role of housing markets in the transmission
mechanism. Vonnák (2005) uses a structural vector autoregression approach to trace
the impact of monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic variables including the nom-
inal exchange rate and market interest rate. Pintér and Wenhardt (2004) use the event
study method to estimate the immediate impact on forward government bond yields.
This paper uses a slightly different approach from that adopted by the latter paper,
which is able to provide consistent estimates for the immediate response of the
exchange rate as well, in which case the event study method fails.
The event study method is commonly used in the literature to analyse the impact of
monetary policy on various asset prices. The main assumption of this approach is that
if one considers a certain subsample of all observations – e.g. days of monetary poli-Introduction
cy decisions – the only important source of innovations in a given asset price is mon-
etary policy. However, Rigobon and Sack (2004) point to the limitations of this
approach which becomes especially relevant if common shocks or shocks to the
asset price itself are present in the subsample chosen for the analysis. Hungarian data
indicate that this is a serious problem in the case of the exchange rate, and less so in
the case of yields which implies that other methods are necessary to analyse the reac-
tion of the exchange rate. 
Rigobon and Sack (2004) propose a method called identification through het-
eroskedasticity which can provide consistent estimates even in cases when the event
study estimate is biased due to common shocks or asset price shocks. This paper
uses this method to investigate how the interest rate decisions of the Magyar Nemzeti
Bank affected the exchange rate of the forint vis-à-vis the euro throughout the first
three years following the widening of the exchange rate band in the middle of 2001.
The paper also examines the impact of monetary policy on spot government bond
yields, on forward yields to assess the impact on the term structure and also on the
stock exchange index.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical considerations
of identifying the impact of monetary policy and provides a brief description of the
estimation method applied here. Section 3 presents the baseline results obtained with
the heteroskedasticity-based method, compares those with the event study method
and checks the robustness of the baseline results. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
9When trying to estimate the response of asset prices to monetary policy steps, one
encounters the problem of endogeneity of the variables. The two variables are simul-
taneously determined, i.e. the central bank reacts to changes in asset prices while
asset prices themselves are also influenced by monetary policy decisions. Another
source of endogeneity is the presence of factors that affect both variables e.g. macro-
economic news, changes in the risk premia etc. In the presence of endogeneity, the
standard ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method gives biased estimates and
this necessitates the use of other techniques.
One way to identify the response of asset prices to monetary policy commonly used
in the literature is the event study method. The main idea here is to use institutional
knowledge and to consider only certain periods when changes in the asset price are
dominated by news about monetary policy. In practice, this usually implies running an
OLS regression on days of policy decisions of the central bank. This method was first
used to estimate the impact of monetary policy on money market yields by Cook and
Hahn (1989) in the case of US. An application of the event study method for Hungarian
data is provided by Pintér and Wenhardt (2004) who find a significant impact of mon-
etary policy shocks on forward yields up to a 3-year horizon. 
Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2004), however, point out that the strict
assumption of the event study method – i.e. that the only important source of innova-
tions in a carefully selected subsample of all observations is news about monetary pol-
icy – may not be satisfied even in a short window of one day and the estimates
obtained may be biased. They propose an alternative identification method which
makes less stringent assumptions about the heteroskedasticity present in the data.
Their heteroskedasticity-based estimation method can thus lead to consistent esti-
mates even in cases when the event study method suffers from a bias.
Rigobon and Sack (2004) consider the following two-equation system to model the
simultaneous relationship of monetary policy and the price of a given asset:
2. Identifying the immediate impact 
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(1)
(2)
where the first equation is a monetary policy reaction function and the second one is
an asset price equation. Δit is the change in the short-term interest rate, Δst is the
change in the price of the given asset and zt is a vector of common shocks. εt is the
monetary policy shock while ηt is a shock to the asset price. The parameter of interest
here is α which measures the reaction of the asset price to changes in the policy vari-
able.
It can be shown that running an OLS regression on (2) will yield a consistent estimate
only if the variance of the monetary policy shock σε is infinitely large in the limit rela-
tive to the variance of the asset price shock ση and to the variance of the common
shock σz. The event study method assumes that this holds if one considers only a cer-
tain subset of all observations, e.g. days of monetary policy decisions. Though in
many cases this might be a plausible assumption, it may not always be the case. 
A further problem of this approach is that it is not possible to test the validity of these
strict assumptions.
On the other hand, the heteroskedasticity-based estimator considers two subsets of
observations: policy dates – which can be defined as days of monetary policy deci-
sions – and non-policy dates – which can be defined as preceding days – and
assumes that the variance of the monetary policy shock increases from non-policy
dates to policy dates, while there is no systematic change in the variances of the other
shocks from one subset to the other. Thus the method does not assume that only mon-
etary shocks matter on policy dates, but rather that the relative importance of mone-
tary shocks with respect to the other shocks increases between the two subsets. In
this sense, non-policy dates are used as a control group in this approach to control
for the effect of asset price shocks and common shocks on the covariance of the two
variables observed on policy dates this way identifying the effect of monetary policy.
To illustrate the difference between the two approaches further, one can say that the
event study method assumes that the OLS estimate is unbiased if one considers only
days of policy decisions. In contrast, the heteroskedasticity-based method does not
11assume unbiasedness on policy days; instead it estimates α from the change in the
bias that occurs between the two subsamples.
Assuming the above-mentioned structure of heteroskedasticity and that the parame-
ters α and β are stable across the two subsets and that the structural shocks are not
correlated with each other and have no serial correlation, Rigobon and Sack (2004)
show that the difference of the covariance matrices of Δst and Δit calculated for the




Thus, ΔΩ is a function of α and a parameter λ, which measures the shift in the mone-
tary policy shock from non-policy dates to policy dates. From this, one can impose
three restrictions on the change in the covariance matrix to obtain α (and λ) since
there are three independent elements in this matrix. 
The estimation can be implemented in two different ways: through an instrumental
variables (IV) interpretation or with generalised method of moments (GMM). Though
the IV approach is easier to implement, it considers only one of the three possible
restrictions. Therefore this estimation method leads to three different estimates, where
one is a geometric average of the other two. The GMM approach, on the other hand,
takes into account all three restrictions at the same time and provides more efficient
estimates. Therefore the GMM estimate provides a cross-check for the multiple esti-
mates obtained with IV. This is useful because even though the multiple IV estimates
should be asymptotically equal for a given asset, it can happen that quantitatively they
are far from each other if one of the IV estimates has high standard errors. In this case,
the quantitative interpretation is more straightforward and more reliable with the help
of the GMM estimate.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Another useful feature of the heteroskedasticity-based approach is that it is possible
to test the assumptions of the model. This can be done either with the IV method by
comparing the multiple estimates using the property that these should be asymptoti-
cally equal. A rejection of the hypothesis that this holds indicates that the assumptions
are not valid. It is also possible to test the assumptions in the GMM approach. Since
we impose three restrictions on the matrix in (3) and estimate only two parameters 
(α and λ), the system is overidentified and the standard test of overidentifying restric-
tions can be applied for this purpose. A significant overidentifying test statistic implies
that the assumptions of the model are not valid.
133. 1. Data
The paper analyses the impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate of the
forint vis-à-vis the euro, on spot government bond yields with maturities of 1, 5 and
10 years, on forward yields 1, 5 and 10 years ahead and on the index of the
Budapest Stock Exchange (BUX). The spot yields are the benchmark yields pub-
lished daily by the Government Debt Management Agency Ltd., while the forward
yields are estimates made by the MNB using the yield-curve estimation method
developed by Svensson (1994). The data are represented as first differences of
daily observations, with the exchange rate and the stock index treated as loga-
rithmic differences. Thus, what is measured here is the impact of monetary policy
in one day
1.
Policy dates include days of rate-setting meetings of the Monetary Council of the
Magyar Nemzeti Bank, while non-policy dates are the preceding working days.
Because of the variations in the timing of the variables, the data series are corrected
in a way that the observations for policy dates contain the information from the central
bank's decisions. The sample covers the period August, 2001 – November, 2004 and
contains 160 observations: 80 dates of Monetary Council meetings and 80 non-policy
dates. The sample includes the regular meetings of the Monetary Council, which took
place every second week until July, 2004 and once every month since then, and also
includes four irregular meetings. 
3. Empirical application
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1 The section examining the robustness of the results presents estimations with a two-day window. One could per-
form the estimation for longer windows measuring the effect of monetary policy on a longer horizon. However, there
is a tradeoff here as in a longer estimation window it is less likely that the importance of policy shocks rises suffi-
ciently for the model's assumptions to be satisfied.
The time-frame of the measured effect is not exactly one day, because different variables are recorded at different
hours of the day and the timing of the publication of the central bank's interest rate decision varies in the sample.
For instance, the exchange rate and the benchmark yields are collected around 15-30 minutes after the publication
of the central bank's decision in a large part of the sample, while forward yields are collected the following morn-
ing except in the case of irregular meetings of the Monetary Council.Empirical application
The analysis focuses on unanticipated moves of the central bank, which take financial
markets as a surprise
2. This is captured by the change in the three-month benchmark
yield, as it is assumed to change only as much as the central bank's move represents a
surprise to the market. Approximating the surprise element of policy rate changes with
three-month yields also has the advantage that they are less likely to be influenced by the
uncertainty regarding the timing of the central bank's action. It is worth noting that with this
approach, keeping the central bank's policy rate unchanged can also represent a sur-
prise to the market which would then be reflected in a change in the short-term yield. In
the paper, the term 'policy rate' refers to this approximation of the surprise element.
Since the estimation method is based on the change in the variance/covariance struc-
ture of the data from one subsample to the other, it is worth analysing this structure.
As can be seen in Table 1, the variance of the policy rate is more than twice as high
15
2 See Vonnák (2005) for a discussion on the importance of focusing on the surprise element of the central bank's
actions in analysing the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In addition, Kuttner (2001) emphasises that
only surprise elements of monetary policy decisions have an impact on market interest rates.
3 Where HUF/EUR denotes the exchange rate, BMK the spot benchmark yields for the relevant maturities, FW the for-
ward yields with the relevant starting dates and BUX the stock exchange index.
Variances Correlations with policy rate
Non-policy Policy Non-policy Policy
Policy rate 0.14 0.33 n.a. n.a.
HUF/EUR 0.47 0.66 0.28 -0.09
1Y BMK 0.20 0.27 0.90 0.94
5Y BMK 0.17 0.16 0.76 0.72
10Y BMK 0.11 0.11 0.75 0.57
1Y FW 0.20 0.29 0.55 0.62
5Y FW 0.19 0.16 0.00 -0.40
10Y FW 0.28 0.23 0.31 -0.42
BUX 1.07 1.41 -0.07 -0.15
Table 1 
Variances of the variables and their correlations with the policy rate
3on policy dates as on non-policy dates, which is in line with the assumption that the
importance of monetary policy shocks is higher on policy dates. 
The correlation structure of the exchange rate shows a positive co-movement with the
policy rate on non-policy dates – suggesting that a rise in the short-term interest rate
is associated with a depreciation of the forint – whereas the relationship is slightly
negative on policy dates
4. The positive relationship on non-policy dates can be the
result of common shocks such as changes in the risk premia or macroeconomic news,
which are likely to affect the exchange rate and the short-term interest rate in the same
direction. On policy dates, however, when the importance of monetary shocks
increases substantially while other shocks are still present, the co-movement
becomes slightly negative, which may imply that monetary policy affects the
exchange rate negatively. From this correlation structure, one would expect a nega-
tive coefficient for the estimate of α in the case of the exchange rate. 
This change in the correlations is also visible on the scatter plots of the two variables
for the two subsamples in Figure 1 and 2. The positive relationship is clearly visible on
non-policy dates, while there is a much less discernible direction on policy dates. 
Each observation plotted on the graphs can be interpreted as an intersection of the
asset price curve and the monetary policy reaction function curve. These intersects
are moving because shocks are continuously hitting both curves. If it is almost exclu-
sively the monetary policy curve that is being hit by monetary shocks while the asset
price curve is stable and there are no common shocks – that is the assumptions of the
event study method are fulfilled – the intersects will be close to the asset price curve.
However, the apparently strong role of common shocks in the case of the exchange
rate suggests that this may not hold on policy dates and the slope coefficient α esti-
mated with OLS for this subsample will suffer from a positive bias. 
On the other hand, given that there is a substantial increase in monetary policy shocks
between the two subsamples, the cloud of the intersections of the two curves will be
rotated towards the monetary policy curve from non-policy dates to policy dates. As
mentioned earlier, the heteroskedasticity-based method estimates α from the change
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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4 A rise in the value of the exchange rate variable represents a depreciation of the forint against the euro.Empirical application
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in the size of the bias, which in this context appears as the rotation of the cloud of real-
isations. Thus, the correlation structure of the exchange rate suggests that the het-
eroskedasticity-based method may provide a better estimate of α than the event study
Figure 1
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HUFEURmethod in the case of the exchange rate and also that the difference between the two
may be substantial.
The correlations of the benchmark yields with the policy rate show a positive co-move-
ment on non-policy dates which increases on policy dates. This may suggest some
role of certain common shocks which push the two variables in the same direction
even on non-policy dates. It also suggests that, contrary to the case of the exchange
rate, monetary policy might affect the 1-year benchmark yield positively. The correla-
tions of the benchmark yields at longer horizons show a similar structure. Based on
this correlation structure, one would expect a much smaller difference between the
two estimation methods for the benchmark yields. 
Regarding the forward yields, one can find a structure similar to that of the bench-
mark yields at the short horizon, while the correlation structure of the 5 and 10 year
forward yields are more similar to that of the exchange rate. The BUX index shows
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3. 2. Results of the heteroskedasticity-based method
The paper applies both ways of implementation of the heteroskedasticity-based esti-
mation method: the IV and the GMM approach. The estimation is implemented on a
joint set of policy dates and non-policy dates for each asset. The instrument for the IV
estimation is based on a transformation of the policy rate where the instrument is equal
to the policy rate with a positive sign on policy dates and with a negative sign on non-
policy dates. For a proof why this is a valid instrument and why it really leads to esti-
mating α from (3), see Rigobon and Sack (2002). The IV estimation can also be car-
ried out with an instrument obtained with a similar transformation of the asset price
variables. The coefficients thus obtained are not significantly different from the ones
reported here (except for the ten-year forward yield), though they show much higher
standard errors.
The IV estimation can be carried out with a standard single-equation two-stage least
squares (TSLS) method. In this case, the asset price variable is regressed on the pol-
icy rate separately for each asset using the relevant instrument. Alternatively, the esti-
19
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BMK1Ymation can be carried out in a system including all the individual asset price equations
using three-stage least squares (3SLS). The latter one is usually preferred as it is more
efficient. However, the coefficients obtained with the two IV methods are almost iden-
tical and the improvement in efficiency is marginal, therefore only the 3SLS results are
reported here. Since the efficiency gain from estimating in system is negligible as
compared to single equations in the case of the IV method, the GMM method is car-
ried out only in single equations. A formal description of the implementation of the
GMM method is provided in Rigobon and Sack (2004).
As can be seen in Table 2, the coefficients are significant with both methods except
in the case of the BUX index. The coefficients obtained with IV and GMM are close for
all variables except for the stock exchange index. This is important because the two
estimations should yield asymptotically equal results provided that the assumptions of
the model are satisfied. The overidentifying restrictions are in line with the fact that only
the BUX shows strongly different coefficients with IV and GMM. The significant overi-
dentifying test statistic for the BUX index implies that the model's assumptions are not
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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I IV V G GM MM M
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Overid.  t-stat. of λ
restr.
HUF/EUR -0.60* 0.28 -0.54* 0.21 1.93 3.5*
1Y BMK 0.66* 0.05 0.70* 0.05 3.05 4.17*
5Y BMK 0.21* 0.06 0.26* 0.04 1.75 4.54*
10Y BMK 0.10* 0.04 0.11* 0.03 0.07 3.88*
1Y FW 0.48* 0.09 0.55* 0.08 2.25 3.76*
5Y FW -0.24* 0.08 -0.25* 0.08 2.92 3.41*
10Y FW -0.50* 0.12 -0.39* 0.12 2.56 4.61*
BUX -0.68 0.56 -20.10* 9.41 12.65* 1.13
* Significant at 5% level.
Table 2 
The results of the instrumental variables and generalised method of moments estimationsEmpirical application
satisfied in this case, while the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected for any
of the other variables.
The heteroskedasticity-based method shows a negative coefficient for the exchange
rate. It implies that a 50 basis-point surprise rate hike results in an immediate 0.27-
0.30 percent appreciation of the forint. Thus, the results show no evidence of the pres-
ence of a 'perverse' effect of monetary policy on the exchange rate, the direction of
the impact is in line with the classic intuition. Though it is not possible to test the UIP
hypothesis with this method due to the lack of high-frequency data on exchange rate
expectations, if one assumes that these expectations do not react to changes in the
policy rate, the result is in line with the UIP condition.
Considering benchmark yields, the results indicate that monetary policy has a positive
impact on spot government bond yields. A 50 basis-point surprise increase of the cen-
tral bank's policy rate leads to a 33-35 basis-point rise in the 1-year benchmark yield
and this effect reduces to around 10 and 5 basis points for the 5 and 10-year yields
respectively. This is in line with the intuition and implies that monetary policy can affect
short-term yields – with a positive sign – but has a much more limited impact on long-
term yields. The effect of monetary policy almost dies out at the ten-year horizon. The
structure of the impact of monetary policy on forward yields helps explain this phe-
nomenon.
The estimated impact of monetary policy on the 1-year forward yield is close to that on
the 1-year benchmark yield; it is only slightly below the latter one. On the other hand,
an unexpected 50 basis-point rate-hike results in a 12 basis-point fall in the 5-year,
and a 20-25 basis-point fall in the 10-year forward yield. In other words, monetary pol-
icy affects the short end of the forward yield curve positively and has a negative
impact on the longer end of the curve, which increases with maturity. Thus, the results
suggest that an unanticipated change in the policy rate leads to a rotation of the for-
ward curve. Based on the expectation hypothesis of the term structure, this implies
that the impact of monetary policy on spot yields diminishes gradually as the maturity
increases.
The result suggesting a rotation of the forward curve in response to monetary shocks
is in line with the insight from the literature that emphasises the role of expected future
21inflation in long-term forward yields. As these yields can be interpreted as the market's
expectations for the future short-term interest rates, the results indicate that a surprise
central bank rate-hike leads to an increase in the short-term horizon and a decrease
in the long-term horizon of the expected future path of short-term interest rates. The
explanation of this can be that a surprise increase in the policy rate may signal a rein-
forced commitment of the central bank to its mandate of achieving and maintaining
price stability allowing lower interest rates in the long-run with the help of higher inter-
est rates temporarily in the short-run. This may have been an important factor in the
years following 2001, when the central bank started an inflation targeting regime with
the aim to help fulfil its mandate.
As mentioned earlier, the highly significant overidentifying test statistic for the BUX
implies that the model's assumptions are not satisfied in this case and therefore these
results are not interpretable. The reasons for this can be that the parameters, α, β or
the shocks to the BUX index or the common shocks show instability between the two
subsamples.
3. 3. Comparison of the event study and the heteroskedasticity-
based methods
Rigobon and Sack (2004) also construct a hypothesis test with which it is possible to
test formally whether the results obtained with the event study method are biased.
Table 3 compares the results of the GMM and event study methods and presents the
biasedness tests
5. 
A quick comparison of the coefficient estimates reveals that the two methods give sim-
ilar results for spot and forward yields. The event study approach produces significant
coefficients for these variables just as the GMM, and the differences between the coef-
ficients are usually at the second decimal. On the other hand, the event study method
fails to give a significant coefficient for the exchange rate, as the parameter obtained
is strongly below the GMM estimate in absolute value. This difference in the size of
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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5 The biasedness tests comparing the event study and the IV estimates mainly lead to the same conclusions and
therefore they are not reported.Empirical application
bias for the exchange rate and for interest rates can be explained with the different
correlation structures as outlined in section 3.1.
The GMM-based result shows that the unbiased coefficient is strongly negative for the
exchange rate. However, there was indication of a strong presence of common shocks
which presumably push the policy rate and the exchange rate in the same direction there-
by reducing the negative impact of monetary policy even on policy dates. As the event
study method ignores this issue, the result obtained with this approach is biased upwards
and thus it gets close to zero. The biasedness test provides strong evidence that the
event study approach gives a biased result in the case of the exchange rate. 
In the case of the benchmark yields, the tests indicate that the event study results are
biased, though they are quantitatively closer to the GMM coefficients than in the case
of the exchange rate. The event study estimates exceed the GMM values for all the
benchmark variables which can again be the result of common shocks ignored by the
former method.
Finally, forward yields represent the only asset class, where the biasedness tests can-
not reject the hypothesis that the event study method provides unbiased estimates.
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E Ev ve en nt t   s st tu ud dy y G GM MM M B Bi ia as se ed dn ne es ss s   t te es st t
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
HUF/EUR -0.09 0.22 -0.54* 0.21 -38.36*
1Y BMK 0.78* 0.03 0.70* 0.05 4.98*
5Y BMK 0.35* 0.04 0.26* 0.04 14.74*
10Y BMK 0.19* 0.03 0.11* 0.03 54.85*
1Y FW 0.53* 0.08 0.55* 0.08 0.25
5Y FW -0.19* 0.05 -0.25* 0.08 0.79
10Y FW -0.30* 0.08 -0.39* 0.12 0.79
BUX -0.65 0.48 -20.10* 9.41 4.28* 
Table 3
Comparison of the event study and the heteroskedasticity-based methodsFor long-term forward yields – as their coefficients are negative similarly to that of the
exchange rate – the event study results are smaller in absolute value than the GMM
results, but the size of the bias is small therefore the coefficients remain significant. It
is worth noting that in this case, the event study approach is more efficient than the
heteroskedasticity-based method.
3. 4. Robustness 
There are several aspects from which the robustness of these results can be checked.
The stability of the coefficients in time is assessed by performing the estimations on a
smaller time-frame: from August, 2001 until December 2002. The reason why this sub-
period is especially interesting is that it excludes the year 2003, in which Hungarian
financial markets experienced several episodes of extreme turbulence. As Table 4
shows, the results for the spot and forward yields obtained for this period are similar
to the baseline estimation, but there is a slightly positive but insignificant coefficient for
the exchange rate. This could imply that only the large changes in the policy rate –
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I IV V G GM MM M
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Overid.  t-stat. of λ
restr.
HUF/EUR 0.32 0.34 0.10 0.11 5.29* 2.07*
1Y BMK 0.94* 0.06 1.03* 0.02 6.63* 1.92
5Y BMK 0.34* 0.05 0.33* 0.03 3.76 1.98*
10Y BMK 0.17* 0.04 0.16* 0.02 1.33 2.09*
1Y FW 0.77* 0.11 0.83* 0.06 6.49* 2.33*
5Y FW 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.04 4.49* 2.27*
10Y FW -0.14 0.20 -0.13 0.07 1.20 2.17*
BUX -1.72 1.27 -1.24 0.28 11.73* 2.10*
Table 4
Results for the period August, 2001- December, 2002Empirical application
which were associated with the turbulent episodes of 2003 – have had a significant
impact on the exchange rate. However, caution is necessary when interpreting these
results as the methods applied are asymptotic estimations and therefore require large
samples. The fact that the sample is much smaller may explain some of the differ-
ences as compared to the baseline estimation. 
To investigate the importance of large moves in the policy rate, the estimation is
also implemented on the entire sample with the exclusion of these observations
6
(Table 5). The coefficients for the benchmark and forward yields are similar to the
baseline estimation, however the assumptions of the model are not satisfied in
many cases. The t-statistics for the λ coefficients are considerably lower than in the
baseline estimations. A possible reason for this can be that the exclusion of the
largest monetary policy steps renders the rise in the variance of policy shocks
insufficient to reach identification in some cases which can be one factor behind
the breakdown of the model. On the other hand, the model's assumptions are sat-
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I IV V G GM MM M
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Overid.  t-stat. of λ
restr.
HUF/EUR -0.81 0.94 -1.01 0.59 0.62 1.85
1Y BMK 0.42 0.24 0.77* 0.09 4.66* 2.94*
5Y BMK -0.24 0.34 0.37* 0.05 8.09* 2.00*
10Y BMK -0.06 0.20 0.10 0.07 2.10 1.81
1Y FW 0.03 0.41 -0.58 0.79 0.11 2.40*
5Y FW 0.23 0.32 -0.20 0.21 11.12* 2.51*
10Y FW -1.03 0.58 0.03 0.20 4.97* 1.67
BUX -5.13 2.66 2.33 5.16 14.24* -0.69
Table 5
Results for the entire sample excluding large changes in the policy rate
6 The excluded observations are days on which the central bank changed the base rate by at least 100 basispoints.
There are altogether 6 such occasions in the sample.isfied for the exchange rate, the λ coefficient is weakly significant and both het-
eroskedasticity-based methods give a negative coefficient larger than the baseline
results. While the coefficient obtained with 3SLS is insignificant, the GMM result is
weakly significant providing weak evidence that small monetary policy steps can
also have an impact on the exchange rate, which in fact may be somewhat greater
than the impact of large steps.
Finally, I also check whether the results change when the estimation is carried out with
a two-day data window
7. As can be seen in Table 6, there is a marked difference for
the exchange rate, as the coefficients obtained for two days are around 3-6 times
higher than the result with a one-day window. This large difference can be interpreted
as a failure of the model to provide stable coefficients. Another and perhaps more
realistic explanation can be the inefficiency of financial markets as it takes time for
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7 There is a technical difficulty in the implementation here because there are two occasions in the sample when two
policy decisions took place on consecutive days. As it is impossible to define policy and non-policy dates in a two-
day window without overlaps in these two occasions, these observations are omitted from the sample.
I IV V G GM MM M
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Overid.  t-stat. of λ
restr.
HUF/EUR -3.62 1.95 -1.74* 0.51 1.49 2.69*
1Y BMK 0.24 3.20 0.18 0.19 0.03 2.42*
5Y BMK 0.08 0.40 -0.04 0.12 3.45 2.47*
10Y BMK -0.72 0.51 -0.15 0.09 2.36 2.36*
1Y FW -0.57 0.36 0.46 0.12 11.49* 3.09*
5Y FW -0.65 0.63 -0.19* 0.11 4.15* 1.85
10Y FW -0.41 0.32 1.20 1.05 5.38* -1.24
BUX -0.68 0.41 -1.23 1.16 1.44 1.45
Table 6
Results obtained with a two-day data windowEmpirical application
market participants to fully adjust to monetary policy shocks
8. The GMM estimate is
strongly significant and the very low overidentifying test statistic for the exchange rate
supports the validity of this result. It is close to the result of Vonnák (2005) stating that
a 25 basis-point rate-hike results in a 1 per cent immediate appreciation of the nomi-
nal exchange rate on quarterly data.
On the other hand, the coefficients for spot yields are smaller than the baseline results
and suggest no significant impact of monetary policy on yields in a two-day window.
It would be interesting to see what kind of response in the term structure lies behind
this, but the method provides no interpretable results for forward yields. Nonetheless,
the point estimates of spot yields' reactions show a similar structure to the baseline
results, i.e. there is a positive impact on the short horizon which falls as the horizon
increases. An interesting result is that the coefficients become slightly negative for
long-term spot yields. This can be partially explained by the small response of the
short end of the curve and highlights again the importance of inflation expectations for
long-term interest rates.
An interesting feature of the two-day results is that the model gives a valid result for
the BUX index. The coefficient is negative, in line with the theoretical prediction,
though it is not significant. This result indicates that monetary policy in Hungary does
not have a substantial influence on the stock exchange index.
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8 It is important to note, however, that the data for the exchange rate and benchmark yields are collected some 15-
30 minutes after the publication of the central bank's decision in a large part of the sample. Thus, what the results
show is that markets fail to incorporate fully the innovation from the central bank's decision in the exchange rate in
such a short time-frame.The paper estimates the immediate impact of Hungarian monetary policy on three
classes of asset prices: the exchange rate of the forint vis-à-vis the euro, market inter-
est rates and the stock exchange index. The endogeneity problem – which stems from
the simultaneous relationship of monetary policy and asset prices and from the pres-
ence of common shocks – is treated with the method of identification through het-
eroskedasticity as described by Rigobon and Sack (2004). 
The results obtained with the heteroskedasticity-based method support the validity of the
classic impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate for Hungary for the period 2001-
2004. There is evidence of a significant negative impact on the exchange rate in one day
suggesting that a 50 basis-point surprise increase in the policy rate causes 0.3 percent
appreciation. This negative effect increases by around 3-6 times when the estimation is
carried out with a two-day window suggesting the inefficiency of markets in incorporat-
ing monetary policy decisions in asset prices in a short period of time. Though it is not
possible to test the UIP hypothesis with this method due to the lack of high-frequency
data on exchange rate expectations, if one assumes that these expectations do not
react to changes in the policy rate, the results are in line with the UIP condition.
The results provide evidence that monetary policy affects spot yields positively, but
this effect gradually dies out as the horizon gets longer. This can be explained with
the impact on the term structure of the yield curve, as the results suggest a positive
impact on short-term and a negative impact on long-term forward yields implying that
a surprise change in the policy rate leads to a rotation of the forward curve. The minor
impact on long-term spot yields and the negative impact on long-term forward yields
are in line with the insight provided among others by Romer and Romer (2000) and
Ellingsen and Söderström (2001) who emphasise that the reaction of long-term yields
to monetary policy depends strongly on the impact of the monetary policy shock on
expected future inflation. 
In the baseline estimation, the method does not provide interpretable results for the
stock exchange index. When the estimation is carried out with a two-day data window,
4. Conclusion
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the method provides a valid result: a negative but insignificant coefficient. The sign is
in line with the intuition, which suggests that monetary contraction leads to a fall in the
stock index. However, the insignificant coefficient indicates that this impact is not sub-
stantial in Hungary.
The significant negative coefficient for the exchange rate shows robustness in sev-
eral alternative estimations. In these estimations, the results for spot yields follow a
similar pattern as in the baseline case with a positive response declining gradually
as the horizon increases, though there is less information in this case as the method
does not produce valid results in many cases. There is very little information about
the robustness of the results for forward yields, since the model usually does not pro-
vide interpretable results in the robustness checks for this variable. Indirect evidence
is available though, as the declining tendency of the response of spot yields sug-
gests a very low, possibly negative impact on long-term forward yields in all alterna-
tive estimations.
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